The fundamental debate that Hamilton and his Anti-Federalist rival ” Brutus ” addressed was over the degree of independence to be granted to federal judges, and the level of accountability to be imposed upon them. This might as well happen in the case of two contradictory statutes; or it might as well happen in every adjudication upon any single statute. Force we understand, decisions made by the courts can only be enforced by the executive branch. In other projects Wikisource. Will means the courts can not interpret laws based on the courts desires, or political views, in other words they are not activists. They thought it reasonable, that between the interfering acts of an EQUAL authority, that which was the last indication of its will should have the preference. Like all of The Federalist papers, it was published under the pseudonym Publius.
They thought it reasonable that between the interfering acts of an equal authority that which was the last indication of its will, should have the preference. They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws rather than by those which are not fundamental. The manner of constituting it seems to embrace these several objects: I mean, so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislative and executive. He says if this happens it only proves there should be no judges.
If the power of making them was committed either to the Executive or legislature, there would be danger of an improper complaisance to the branch which possessed it; if to both, there would be an unwillingness to hazard the displeasure of either; if wha the people, or to persons chosen by them for the special purpose, there fedralist be too great a disposition to consult popularity, to justify a reliance that nothing would be consulted but the Constitution and the laws.
Sir William Blackstone explains in his landmark treatise on the common lawCommentaries on the Laws of England:. It is urged that the authority which can declare the acts of another thessis, must necessarily be superior to the one whose acts may be declared void.
There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void. It examines primarily the term of office for judges but in making the case for lifetime appointments it details the responsibilities of the federal courts. Though I trust the friends of the proposed Constitution will never concur with its enemies, 3 in questioning that fundamental principle of republican government, which admits the ia of thexis people to alter or abolish the established Constitution, whenever they find it inconsistent with their happiness, yet it is not to be inferred from this principle, that the representatives of the people, whenever a momentary inclination happens to lay hold of a majority of their constituents, incompatible with the provisions in the existing Constitution, would, on that account, be justifiable in a violation of those provisions; or that the courts would be under a greater obligation to connive at infractions in this shape, than when they had proceeded wholly from the cabals of the representative body.
Federalist No. 78
A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. In England, although most agents of the Crown served “at the pleasure of papef King,” public officials were often granted a life tenure in their offices.
These considerations apprise us that the government can have no great option between fit characters; and that a temporary duration in office which would naturally discourage such characters from quitting a lucrative line of practice to accept a seat on the bench would have a tendency to throw the administration of justice into hands less able and less well qualified to conduct it with utility and dignity. To these points, therefore, our observations shall be confined. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever.
Like all of The Federalist papers, it was published under the pseudonym Publius.
This might as well happen thesiz the case of two contradictory statutes; or it might as well happen in every adjudication upon any single statute.
Rather, it is the responsibility of the federal courts to protect the people by restraining the legislature from acting inconsistently with the Constitution:. This page was last edited on 8 Marchat So far as they can, by any fair construction, be reconciled to each other, reason and law conspire to dictate that this should be done; where this is impracticable, it becomes a matter of necessity to give effect to one in exclusion of the other.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. The remainer of the paper continues the arguments for life long appointments based on being independent from the other branches of government and factions within the population, and the requirement for obtaining the most learned in the law and precedence to serve which would not happen if terms were short.
But it is easy to see, that it would require an uncommon portion of fortitude in the judges to do their duty as #788 guardians of the Constitution, where legislative invasions of it had been instigated by the major voice of the community.
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. The standard of good behavior for the continuance in office of the judicial magistracy, is certainly one of the most valuable of the modern improvements in the practice of government.
Considerate men of every description ought to prize whatever will tend to beget or fortify that temper in the courts; as no man can be sure that he may not be tomorrow the victim of a spirit of injustice, by which he may be a gainer today. Second, the tenure by which they are to hold their places, and third, the partition of the judiciary authority between different courts and their relations to each other.
So far as they can, by any fair construction, be reconciled to each other, reason and law conspire to dictate that this should be done; whwt this is impracticable, it becomes a matter of necessity to give effect to one, in exclusion of the other.
To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them. And it pper the best expedient which can be devised in any government, to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws.
Federalist Papers Summaries Index Page.
Federalist Papers Summary 78
He begins by comparing the power of the judiciary to the other branches of government and claims the judiciary is the least dangerous to the political rights of the constitution for it controls neither the sword of the executive nor the purse controlled by the legislative. The experience of Great Britain affords an illustrious comment on the excellence of the institution. I Hamilton mean so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislative and executive.
It is far more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to be an intermediate fedderalist between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The heart of this essay covers the case for the duration of judges in office. It proves incontestably, that the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power ##78 ; that it can never attack with success either of the other two; and that all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks.
Federalist Papers Summary 78
The mode of whzt the judges. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The partition of the judiciary authority between different courts and their relations to each other.